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ON UNDERSTANDING INDIAN PHILOSOPIIIC.l\L THINKlNG 
by 
0. C. Mathur 
ALI attempts to understand lndian Philosophical thinkingl (rommencing with 
the poetic outpourings of the Vedic seers and the speculative ventures of the 
Upani�adic sages and including the later systematic writings-both orthodox 
and heterodox) in terms of sweeping generalizations as either being "essentiaUy 
spiritual", "atheistic", "religious" or "materialistic" have been guilty of ovcr­
simpli fication. In view or the extreme complexity, subtlety and long historical 
span of Indian philosophizing it will be naive and hazardous to "understand" iL  
in terms of any neat formula. AU possible schools and viewpoints, such as 
idealism, naturalism, materialism, real ism, empiricism, Lranscendentalism, abso­
lutism, etc., elc. have been represented in India's philosophies. It is Lherefore 
evidt:!nl that a sweeping claim lo "�pirituality" in contra-distinction to Western 
Philosophy's implied lack of it must be repudiated. Such a claim is all Lhe more 
implausible if "spirituality" is identified wilh atheistic belief in God. Polter in 
his paper has pointed out how and on what grounds Daya, Ricpe, Anikeev and 
Debiprasad ChaLLopadhyaya have vehemenlly contested and rejected this 
characterization of [ndian philosophizing. But Potter has reiterated in this 
paper his earlier interpretation that philosophies in India have been mainly con· 
cerned with mok�a or transcendemal freedom. and that speculative arguments 
were marshalled Lo remove doubts arising from skeptical and fatalistic positions. 
Riepe challenges, in jest and in earnest, such an idealistic interpretation as 
puerile and naive. The main thrust of his contention is that such a piece-meal 
interpretation of ideas which ignores their socio-historical context is bound lo 
"mystify" and confound people instead of enlightening them. Riepe attempts 
a Marxist interpretation or Indian philosophy (in line with Chatlopadhyaya 
and Anikeev) and illustrates his thesis with the help of two examples. 1l will be 
the aim of my paper to point out the reasons for the seeming plausibility o f  
these two contrasting positions and bring oul their limitations. 
One of the outstanding features of India's philosophies, with the exception 
of the Carvaka materialists, hac; been its continuing concern and almost an 
obsessive preoccupation with the self and its freedom. Such an existential 
concern is prominent in the speculati ons of the Upani�ads as well as in the 
teachings of the historical Buddha. The seers of the Upani!iads as well as the 
Buddha were deeply impressed by lhe passing, the transient and the transitory 
nature of all phenomena. It was natural for them lo be dissatisfied with the 
obvious fact that nothing in the world lasts and endures. Change, both in nature 
and society, is bound to c�111 for adaptation, and if it is too rapid as in times of 
social and political turmoil. it may give rise to philosophies of "transcendence" 
or "withdrawal". The Upani�adic doctrine of the Atman or Brahman was the 
outcome of such a quest for certainty, intelligibility and unification in the face 
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of manifest di\'ersily and mu ltiplicily of all natural and social phenomern. The 
Aryan hordes after seltling down in the tropical climate or the lndo-Gangetic 
plains were faced with the task of conquering the native Lribes and of learning 
Lhe arts of agriculture. 'l'he class-system ( Brahmans. Ksatriyas, Vaisyas and I -
Sudras) emerged as a resu lt.. The old tribal unity or the Aryan nomadic hordes 
was losl. The quest for u unified princ:iple o f  intelligibility (in terms of Atman or 
Brahman) was partly nostalgic and partly a resull of curiosity. The old tribal 
solidarity was gone, and with a new socio-economic structure class disthctions 
became prominent. However, it was difficult Cor lhe ancienl t.hinkers of lhe 
Upani�ds to have a thorough intellectual grasp of the changes in the stwcture 
of lheir society. !laving lost practical social unit) they compensated for it by 
positing a transcendental principle of unit) (Brahman) behind all the passing 
particulars of nature and sociel}. Their error was in hypostati1.ing this principle 
of unit) into an Absolute Reality (with its capilali1.ed solidity) as against the 
"lower" reality or "phenomenality" of natural events. No doubt., the concept 
of Brahman of At.man fulfilled I.heir need for secul"ity, unification and intelli 
gibilily-giving them an oxperience of a different order (ananda or bli:;s) and 
quality. This imaginath·e experience lifted them oul of lhe humdn.m and 
repetitive nature of the passing parliculars.2 
The historical Buddha, though denying ostensibly the concept of Atman 
(transccrndental Self), was responding lo the all-pervasive phenomenon of 
change and transcience precisely in lhe same way as lhe thinkers or the Upani�ds. 
The Buddhistic concept o f  suffering is not m<'rely that of physical or mental 
pain bul is of deeper poignant significance. lt dramatizes the felt tension 
between the fact lhat nothing really lasts and endures, and the deep-seated 
human need to sling to and be emotionally entangled with our natural and 
social concerns. Buddha's. concept of Nirvana is a "withdrawal-response" to . 
the all-pervasive facl of transience. Buddhistic emphasis on universal love, com· 
passion, understanding and tranquillity served an import.anl psychological 
fundion of bolstering inner human resources in the face of t·hange. But 1l 
failed Lo lake note of the fact that it was well-nigh impossible to develop non­
aLtachment and love for aJI human beings without a roncomitanl socio-economic 
change and a well-directed restructurin� of socieLy. In other wo1·ds I.he pen·asive 
fact of change is neither to be lamented over (giving rise to "metaphysical" con­
cept of suffering of the Buddha), nor Lo be sentiment.all}' gloaled upor .. but it 
to be noted and made use of in guiding social processes in an inlelligent manner. 
The Buddhislic withdrawal into monasteries was one-sided emphasis on personal 
and psychological Lramformation without. any reference lo a social trans­
formation in the world outside. 
Such an existential concern with one's seU together with an effort lo 
"transcend" the temporal flux is a common feature both of the Upani�ds and 
Buddhism. >lay. it has remained a constant backdrop lo all later philosophizing. 
Though Polter is right in pointing out Lhal mok�a or transcendental fre<?dom has 
been a central concept in India's philosophies he has (ailed to see lhe Larger 
socio-economic context in which such a concern arose and gripped lhe Indian 
mind. He isolates this phenomenon from ils social setting as Riepe points oul 
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in his ctilicism of Potter's paper. lt is this obsessive concern with the self and its 
realization through immediate intuitive experience, and its de-identification 
Crom anything natural-body, mind, senses elc.-that accounts for the seeming 
plausibility of the view that Indian philosophy is essentially "spiritual." 
Secondly. most classical Indian philosophers (whether Hindu, Jain or Buddhist), 
while recognizing the eddent importance of logic, language and argument. have 
given primary importance to immediate experience. Philosophical problems and 
arguments arose simply from the obvious fact that immediate experience 
(whether sensuous or allegedly super-sensuous) in its existential occurrence is 
non-cognitive and therefore. requires a conceptual articulation in order to be 
communicated. Potter's thesis that speculative arguments arose only Lo remove 
doubts (intellectual) and thus facilitate the adoption of a specific path to mok�a 
is too narrow. It implies not only the universal acceptance of moksa as the 
ultimate ideal but also that it was somehow beyond the pale or phil�sophicaJ 
inquiry. Neither mok� nor any other aspect or human experience could be 
accepted on its face-value simply on the ground of its occurrence. Nothing is 
beyond the scope of philosophical inquiry. Once conceptual articulation lakes 
place it is obvious that philosophical problems arise and the sheer intellectual 
need for consistency requires us to think them through. Hence arise all the 
problems and puzzles about the nature of substance, causality, change, per­
manence, self and not-self, subject and object, knowledge and belief, experience 
and existence etc., etc. They are interminable. But the inference drawn from 
these seemingly unending philosophical problems by Nagarjuna and Samkara, 
and endorsed by Potter. that reason is incapable of grasping "reality" shows a 
great confusion regarding the nature and funcLion or reason vis-a-vis experience. 
Potter seems to think seriously that the idealistic and transcendental philoso­
phies of Nagarjuna or Samkara "provide attractive candidates for the role of 
true philosophy" as an escape "between the horns of lhe contemporary 
dilemma between theology and technology, faith and reason". It is amazing to 
find that Potter instead of analyzing the factors in contemporary Western 
society responsible for the burgeoning or interest in such "anti-rational" or 
"super-rational" philosophies such as Zen or Advaita, uncritically accepts 
Madhyamika and Advaita as viable alternatives to science and reason. He im­
plies a derogatory and narrow use of "science" as mere "scientism". Science 
need not be confused with mere technology or with the human (or non­
human) application of it. Scientific method of free cooperative inquiry, 
willingness to consider all available evidence and freedom from personal bias 
and prejudice is the only alternative to an uncritical and blind acceptance of 
allegedly "supra-rational" philosophies of "transcendence" which debunk and 
devalue reason in a wholesale manner and debar it from the "innermost" 
sanctuary of reality. Potter seems :o be dazzled by the dialectics of Nagarjuna 
and S�mkara (or or F. H. Bradley in the Western tradition) and concurs in 
their relegation of the whole rational enterprize lo the realm of "appcaran,ce1' 
againsl the background o f  a "transcendental reality" which remains impervious 
to rational modes of inquiry. He is taken in by the subtle, yet seductive logic of 
Nagarjuna and S�mkara withoul being aware of their assumptive use of the 
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concept of ·�realit)" or "'phenomena··. The s'unya\'nda o f  l\a�arjuna and the 
Ad,·aila of Samkara both as.5ume a particular \·ie\\ of "rcahl)" as sor1et h1ng 
eternal, unchanging and permanent. Here is a quc .. t for certaint\. for freedom 
from all doubt and escape from change and transitorincs..-; of al I '' orldl� things 
and pursuit!i. E\'en the dever .. no-,·iew" doctrine of '\a�ar1una implies uncon­
sciously some \'iew of "reality"', and idealistic philosoplwn; like T.R. \'. �lurti 
- - "- -
ha\'e been quick to interpret NagarJuna's t•on<·l•pl of 8unyala as the Lrans-
ct•ndt.>nlal Absolute.3 All such absolutist philosophies whid1 denigrate Lhe 
whole rationalistic enterprLi:e as mere "appearance" forgt•t the imporlanl 
di.,tinction between "ha\ing" an experience and ''talking about" il in mti on al 
discour.;c. They do not realize that the function of rational Lhought is not to 
"dt'vour'' ex perienced realiLy but lo articulate, clarify and organize il. The 
whole <.'ognitive enterpriGe in terms or conc·(1 plual categories is never a sub· 
slitul<' for .. having" a full-blooded, concrete and vivid cxpcrl<.>nt•e>. But this does I • - -
nol mean, as has been asserted by Samkara, NagarJunn or Bradley, that since 
t•oncepl ual problems and paradoxes arise in the course of such articulation lhe 
whole rational cnterprize therefore belonw• lo H "lower" order of r>?ality­
"mere" phenomena�as against Absolul(• Reality �ivcn in 11 mystical intuitive 
C'Xpcrience. Conceptual p'li losophical problems may aris(' bt•causc or unexamined 
assumptions, inadequate attention to the nature> and function of lang1..age, or 
failure to refer back these concepts lo the bar of immediate cxperien<-e. 
\nolher factor which has given rise to the belief lhal Indian philos·1ph} is 
es..�nliall} ·'spiritual'' is that not onl}- Vedanta, �Iadh}amika and other 
idealistic schools but also realistic schools such as Samkh}a, Nyayn and Jainism 
have not limited the concept of experienN' to mer<' sensuoui. C\'.pericnce but 
ha\'e included (wilh emphasis on its superior status) some kind of "tr.mscen­
dental" and super-sensuous experience under il. \II their claims to a pr \'ileged 
acces_c; to realil} are basec on their absolute reliant'<? on such a super-..ensuous ex­
pcrienrc. F'rom lhe stridy philosophical poinl of \iC\\ all kinds of exrerience 
are subject lo rational examination or their cognili\'C daims. This means lhat 
there has to be a continuing interplay between cxperienct• and dialectic;. Such 
an interplay need not lead to a confusion between lht?ir distinclivc yet mutually 
inLerdC'pendenl roles. Dialectical discourse should enrid1 and clarif� our "lived" 
E>xperienct-which in ils Lurn should enable us lo sharpen our rational cate­
J!Ories so as lo be able to further clarify experience. 'l'his i'i an ongomf! process 
and belongs lo lhe same order of reality. Any attempt lo bifurcule the uni \'erse 
into two orders of reali ly-"t.ranscendenlal" and "phenomenal" nol onl) bet.rays 
u great con fusion of thought but is fraught with the �ravest of social con­
sequences. The social and political history or India illust rates the di�tSt.rous 
consequences of such a hiatus between realil} and appcaratwc . Contemporary 
India should get rid o f  this dead dross of the past so as to rt'lease its energy for 
rapid socio-economic change based on coopcrati\'C intelligent'C of 1Ls people. 
A rew words about Riepe's approach lo India'!; philosophies may be added 
here. Profes.sor Riepe is right in believing that Indian philosophic·al thought 
cannot be "understood'" in a piece-meal isolated manner as if "ideas" spring 
up from the blue air or from people's heads ready-m.1de. Ile rejects all idealistic 
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interpretations as arrant nonsense. He positively adopts a materialistic inter­
pretation of the Marxist variety to render Indian thought intelligible. No 
doubt, a socio-historical interprelalion of ideas is logically sound provided no 
linear, one-sided dependence of ideas on socio-economic factors is insisted upon. 
Marx and Engels, as is well-known, had spent quite an amount of lime and 
thought on the mutual relationship between the "infra-structure" and the 
"super-structure" in any social analysis. A monolithic analysis of ideas is Loo 
simplistic and is based on a dogmatic and one-sided interpretation o f  social 
history. As a matter of fact there is not one society. There are various social 
groups. There is not one History. with a capital "H". There are several histories. 
History is not an entity or a mystical force. There is no one iron law of 
dialectical materialism. It is therefore important to realize that the concepts of 
society and history are complex, and are best understood in the plural than in 
the singular. Socio-economic factors do give rise Lo ideologies, but man·s con­
scious understanding of these factors adds a new dimension to the historical 
process. Ideas are capable of dialectical development Loo. In other words there 
is a history of ideas also. H is Lherefore quite natural that once the socio­
historical process gives rise Lo ideas, these ideas in their turn can give rise t.o 
certain conceptual, philosophical problems. There is no rigid determinism in a 
one-sided manner. 'T'he long hislory of philosophical disputes between rival 
systems of Indian Philosophy during the Sutra period, and the philosophical con­
frontation between Buddhist logicians and idealists (of Lhe Dignaga school) and 
Nyaya-Vai�sika philosophers (Uddyotkara and his followers) during the six 
hundred ye;rs (5th century A.O. to 1 1th century A.D.) shows how ideas are 
capable of generJting their own problems. Though it is possible to throw light 
on these disputes by studying then: in their socio-historical context, yet they 
cannot be "explained" without residuum merely on such an analysis. 
Today lhere certainly is an urgent need to study Indian philosophical thought 
in lhe concrete developing socio-historical context and to take it out of it.s 
surrounding mystical "idealistic" haze so that a fruitful dialogue may ensue 
between historical experience and philosophical ideas. Any divorce between 
historical experience and philosophical ideas will leave concrete socio-historical 
problems without control and guidance on lhe one hand, and on the other will 
make philosophical ideas effete-fit to be stacked in the museum o f  antiquities. 
FOOTNOTES 
11 have deliberately us<'d the pervasive concept of 11philosophic11l thinking" instead of 
"philosophy" to avoid any veiled slipul:i.Lion about the "correct" nature of philosophy. 
This I!> noL the place Lo discuss the philosophical question: "What is philosophy?" Only 
an "ostcn�1ve" definition of philosophy ha� been adopted here with respect to the whole 
gamut of Indian philosophtcal Uunklni:. 
2For an elaboration of this point sec rnv paper "The ConcepL or Self in the Upumsads: An 
Alternative Jn lcrpretulion", Plailosoplty an cl Phe11omc>110/ogica/ Researclr, BuCfalo� Mnrch, 
1972. pp. 390-96. / 31 have criticized Nagarjuna's concept or Sunvata and brought out ils implicit assumptions 
in my paper "Experience and Dialecl1cs: A Study in Dialectical tnu•rplay". Dio1tr>1w11, No. 
60. Paris. 1967. pp. 35-50. 
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